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CHARLES R. NESSONt
INTRODUCTION
The abrupt conclusion  of the recent trial of Daniel  Ellsberg  was,  in
its way,  disappointing.  What  was  to have  been  a  trial  focused  on the
revelation of secret executive operations  in Vietnam became a case history
of secret  executive  operations  on  domestic  soil.  This  meant that  vital
questions  about the  secrecy  classification  system on which the  merits  of
the case turned would not be resolved:  whether, for example, the govern-
ment  owns  classified  information  in  the  same  way  it  owns  tangible
property like jeeps and typewriters,  and  can control the dissemination  of
classified  information by using the relatively absolute powers  of property
control.  It meant also that everyone associated  with the trial was denied
the dramatic and emotional satisfaction of seeing almost two years of hard
work brought to conclusion in a jury verdict.
Yet, the denouement of the Ellsberg case was a fitting illustration of
something  that  had  motivated  Ellsberg  to  release  the  Pentagon  Papers
in the first place.  The revelations  of burglary and wiretapping of United
States citizens  on United States soil, wrapped in justifications  of national
security, and blanketed with the secrecy of covert paramilitary intelligence
operations,  showed  how easily the  unchecked  corruption  of  the  secrecy
system  could  be  made  to  serve  justification  for  other  more  dangerous
unchecked  powers.  It illustrated  how  readily  the enormous  powers  we
permit  the President to  exercise  abroad  under  the  cloak  of  secrecy  can
be turned  to serve  executive  interests  at home, and  how, in the  process,
it can swallow fundamental  liberties.  The  case,  including  its end, began
to  forge  a link  between  Vietnam  and  Watergate  from  which  a  basic
proposition should emerge:  the inherent  powers of the President to keep
secrets  and to operate in secret  without  check  by the  Judiciary  or  Con-
gress have grown to proportions which threaten the constitutional balance,
and must be brought under the rule of law.
'Executive  assertions  of inherent  national  security  powers  call  into
question  basic  power  allocations  within  the  governmental  framework,
t  Professor of Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  Professor  Nesson  was  a  defense  attor-
ney  for Daniel  Ellsberg.  This  material  was  first  delivered  as a  speech  in  the  Addison
C. Harriss  Lecture  Series at Indiana University  School of Law,  Nov. 19,  1973.INDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
questions  which fall for resolution to the judiciary.  Judgments  as to the
legality  of the  assertions  of  such  powers  typically  require  the  courts  to
resolve  a  conflict  between  executive  arguments  of  necessity  based  on
national security, on the one hand, and arguments of infringement of indi-
vidual  liberties and democratic  principles,  on the other.'  Yet the conflict
is not only  one  of  substance,  it is  also  one  of competencies.  While the
Judiciary may suspect that the national security bureaucracy of the execu-
tive  branch  may  undervalue  the  principles  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  the
executive  branch  questions  the  competence  of  the  Judiciary  to  evaluate
the needs of national security.
In  fact,  the  evaluation  of  national  security  decisions  is  highly  un-
congenial  to  the  judicial  process.  Fact  finding  in  secret,2  security
clearances  for  lawyers,  litigants,3  and  perhaps  even  judges,'  and  the
breadth  and  diversity  of possible  inquiry,  all  make for  nonjusticiability.
Even if means  can be  jerrybuilt to  produce  a factual  record,  judges  are
in  a  poor  position  to  evaluate  it.'  The  nation  may  rest  a  measure  of
trust in the Judiciary's  moral leadership, but none in the ability of judges
to second guess the President and his generals  on military and diplomatic
Tnatters where the nation's safety is concerned.
The Judiciary is thus  faced with an apparent dilemma  in judging the
legality of asserted inherent national security powers.  If the courts defer
to executive competence  in assessing  the needs  of national  security,  the
effect  may  be  to consign  to  the  Executive  the  protection  of  individual
liberties  to  which  the national  security  bureaucracy  may  be  insensitive.
Yet  the  alternative  of  asserting  the  primacy  of  individual  liberties  re-
quires  the  Judiciary,  either  implicitly  or  explicitly,  to  take  on  the  un-
congenial  task of  evaluating  the asserted  needs  of national  security  and
saying that  the President  is  wrong.
One tool employed by the Judiciary to assess the President's inherent
power  over  national  security  matters  is  to  inquire  into  the  ability  of
1.  E.g.,  New  York Times  Co. v. United  States, 403  U.S.  713  (1971);  Youngstown
Sheet  & Tube  Co.  v.  Sawyer,  343  US.  579  (1952)  ;  Korematsu  v.  United  States,  323
U.S.  214  (1944);  Ex parte Milligan,  71  U.S.  (4  Wall.)  2  (1866).
2.  Most  of  the evidentiary  record  in  New  York  Times  Co.  v. United  States,  403
U.S.  713  (1971),  is comprised  of  secret testimony  and  submissions.  The  record  remains
secret
3.  In  United  States  v.  Marchetti,  466 F.2d  1309  (4th  Cir.),  cert. denied, 409  U.S.
1063  (1972),  for example, where  the  Government was seeking  to enjoin  an ex-CIA  agent
from publishing  a book,  clearances  were  required  for  the  lawyers  and  expert  witnesses.
4.  The  Government  comes  close to  suggesting this  in  its  brief  in  United  States  v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S.  297  (1972).  Brief for United $tates  at 24-25, id.
5.  New  York  Times  Co. v.  United  States,  403  U.S.  713,  757  (1971)  (Harlan,  J.,
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Congress  to  regulate  this  expression  of  executive  power.  An  asserted
inherent power will necessarily fall into one of four conceptual categories.
It must be:  (1)  a power legally exercisable  by the executive branch,  not
subject  in  any  way  to  control  by  Congressf6  (2)  a  power  which  the
Executive  may exercise  in  the  absence  of  congressional  preclusion,  but
which  Congress  could  regulate  or  preclude  if  it  chose;'  (3)  a power
which  is  not legally  exercisable  by  the  Executive  unless  authorized  by
Congress ;'  or  (4)  a power which cannot be exercised  by the Executive,
notwithstanding  an attempted  congressional  authorization.
Explicit  constitutional  delegation  of  power  to  the  President  and
explicit  constitutional prohibition epitomize  categories  one and four.  But
the characteristics of asserted powers which would distinctively place them
in the second category rather  than the third, and  vice versa,  are not im-
mediately  clear.  Yet the practical  difference  between  a  judicial  judgment
placing an asserted power in one or the other category may be enormous.
That is to say, a judgment that the asserted power can be exercised by the
Executive subject to possible  future congressional  regulation provides  no
immediate check to this power.  It merely preserves a congressional  option
to create  one.  By contrast,  a judgment that the power  is one which  can
be exercised only with the authority of Congress may create an immediate
check  to  the  power,  but  on  an  intermediate  basis  which  reserves  the
question  of the  long-term  allocations  of  national  security  powers  to the
decisions of Congress.  This means,  in effect,  that while the Judiciary is
not fully competent  to evaluate  the  needs  of national  security,  Congress
is.  The result is to set the force of inertia against the asserted power.  It
places  the burden of going  forward on  the executive branch,  and, at the
same time, insulates  the Judiciary from the responsibility of second guess-
ing the executive's  national  security  assessment.
I want to focus in this  article on the two specific inherent  executive
powers  which  were  central  to the  Ellsberg  case and consider  the  proper
6.  For  example,  the  power  to make  strategic  military  decisions  in  wartime  would
be  encompassed  within the  President's  explicitly  stated  power  as  Commander-in-Chief.
U.S.  CoNsr. art. II, § 2.
7.  Cf.  Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube  Co.  v.  Sawyer,  343  U.S.  579  (1952).  In
Youngstown,  the Supreme  Court  held  that  President  Truman's  seizure  of  the  nation's
steel  mills  exceeded  the  Executive's  inherent  constitutional  powers,  in  part  because  he
acted  contrary to  congressional  policy  expressed  in the provisions  and  legislative  history
of  the  Taft-Hartley  Act.  See id. at 634-55  (Jackson,  J.,  concurring).  See also  New
York  Times  Co.  v. United ,States,  403  U.S.  713  (1971),  in  which  Justices  White  and
Stewart rely on an  evident past refusal  of the  Congress  to  authorize  injunctive  remedies
against the press  to deny the Executive  an inherent power  to seek such injunctions.  Id. at
734,  740.
8.  See, e.g.,  New  York  Times  Co.  v.  United  States,  403  U.S.  713,  741-43  (1971)
(Marshall,  J., concurring).INDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
judicial  and  congressional  responses  to  their  use:  first,  the  power  of
national security secrecy  classification, which got the case underway,  and
second, the power to use warrantless  wiretaps  in connection with foreign
intelligence,  which brought the case to its close.  Each serves to illustrate
the  limitations  of  the  Judiciary  and  the  Congress  to  check  executive
national  security  powers.  On  the  basis  of  my  understanding  of  these
two powers  and  their  abuses,  I  conclude  that  notwithstanding  the  dif-
ficulties of doing so, it is essential for the courts  and Congress to,  develop
checks against them.
SECRECY CLASSIFICATION
Secrecy  classification  theoretically  restricts  the  dissemination  of
documents,  the disclosure  of which would  injure  national security.9  The
three most well known  classification  categories,  listing from most to least
restrictive,  are  Top  Secret,  Secret,  and  Confidential." 0  Let us  assess  the
system on its strongest ground.
The classification Top Secret is limited by executive rule to informa-
tion  which could  reasonably  be  expected  to  cause  grave  damage  to the
national  security."  Information  which  would  start wars or cause  diplo-
matic breaks are cited as examples.  The rules limit the number of persons
empowered  to  make  this  determination  to  high  echelon  officers  in  the
executive  departments  and agencies  connected  with  national  defense.'2
These classification rules give the appearance of strict limitation,  but
they are wholly illusory.  Most information is in fact classified by a process
known  as  derivative  classification.'"  This  process  effectively  gives  the
9.  Exec. Order No.  11,652,  § 1, 3 C.F.R. 375-76  (1973).  This executive  order was
promulgated  on  March  8,  1973,  and  superseded  Exec.  Order  No. 10,501  which  governed
the classification  of the Pentagon  Papers.  Exec. Order  No. 11,652  was  intended to  meet
many of  the  criticisms  of  Exec. Order  No.  10,501.
10.  Exec.  Order  No.  11,652,  §  1, 3  C.F.R.  375-76  (1973).
11.  Id. § 1 (A),  3  C.F.R. 376  (1973).
"Top  Secret."  "Top  Secret"  refers  to  that national  security  information  or  ma-
terial  which  requires  the highest  degree  of  protection.  The  test  for  assigning
"Top  Secret"  classification  shall  be  whether  its  unauthorized  disclosure  could
reasonably  be  expected  to cause  exceptionally  grave  damage  to the  national  se-
curity.  Examples  of  "exceptionally  grave  damage"  include  armed  hostilities
against the United States  or its allies;  disruption of  foreign relations  vitally af-
fecting  the national  security;  . . ..  This  classification  shall  be  used  with
the utmost restraint.
Id.
12.  Id. § 2(A),  3 C.F.R. 377  (1973).
13.  According to Mr. J. Fred  Buzhardt,
There are  no data  available  subject to verification  from which  to  determine  the
volume  of  information  to  which  classification  markings  have  been  applied  pur-
suant to  classification  guidance  [derivative  classification]  ....
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power  of  secrecy  classification  to  any  persons  who  are  cleared  to  see
documents  in the respective classification categories.  Whenever  a person
uses  a Top Secret  source in preparing  a new document he  is obliged  to
classify  the new  document  according  to  the  classification  of  his  source
of  information.'  Since  documents  must  carry  the highest  classification
of their component parts, 1" any document which uses a Top Secret source
can itself be  classified Top  Secret.  Classification  is the  responsibility  of
the man who prepares the  new document.  He  is said  to have derivative
classification  authority.  Thus, any of the more  than  450,000  persons  in
the government  who have  Top Secret classification  clearances"  are  em-
powered  to create Top Secret documents.  In addition, since classification
is  typically  both anonymous  and  nonspecific," 7  a  user  of  a Top  Secret
source has no way of knowing what particular piece  of information in the
source document  led to  its being classified Top  Secret.  As  a result,  the
derivative classifier will apply the Top Secret Classification to lis product
if he has  used any information  whatsoever  from a Top  Secret  source.
As  can be imagined,  the  process  has  its  own  peculiar  malignancy.
Since research  and discussion  on any  subject  naturally  derive  from  and
cite  to  the  central  literature  on  the  subject,  every  classified  document
becomes  a  seed  from  which  other  classified  documents  can  grow.  If
Blackstone had  classified  his  commentaries  Top  Secret,  then  derivative
the House Comm.  on  Government Operations, 92d  Cong.,  1st  & 2d  Sess.  2523  (1972)
[hereinafter  cited as Hearings].
14.  Exec.  Order  No.  11,652,  §  2,  3  C.F.R.  376-78  (1973),  delegates  authority  to
classify  "originally."  The  current  Executive  Order  nowhere  defines  any  secondary  or
derivative  authority.  ,Section 6(C)  provides:  "Classified  information  and material  shall
be used  . . . only under conditions  which will prevent  access by unauthorized  persons  or
dissemination  to unauthorized  persons."  Id. § 6(C),  3  C.F.R. 383  (1973).  This  section
appears  to subsume  the  well established  practices  of derivative  classification.
This is made explicit by the implementing  regulations  of the  Department of Defense.
DOD  Directive, 32  C.F.R.  §§  159.202-9,  -15  (1973).  Section  159.202-15  provides:  "In-
formation  or  material  extracted  from  a classified  source  will  be  classified  . . .in  ac-
cordance with the classification  marking  shown  in  the  source."  Id. §  159.202-15.  Sec-
tion 159.202-9  provides  in part:  "The overall classification  of a document,  file,  or  group
of  physically  connected  documents  shall be  at least  as  high  as  that  of  the most  highly
classified component."  Id. § 159.202-9.
15.  DOD  Directive, id. § 159.202-9.
16.  According  to  Department  of  Defense  answers  to  questions  by  Senator  Ful-
bright, DOD  had 458,682  outstanding  "Top  Secret"  clearances  as of  September  24,  1971.
This figure  did  not include  clearances  issued by  other  government  agencies.  118  CONG.
REC.  S-8855  (daily  ed. June 6,  1972).
17.  The new  Executive Order  (11,652)  and implementing  regulations  call  for  isola-
tion and identification  of the items  causing  classification  and of  the persons who  classify.
See DOD  Directive, 32  C.F.R.  §§  159.202,  202-1  (1973).  However  the  old  Executive
Order  (10,501)  and implementing  regulations also purported to require  "component"  clas-
sification  but  these  provisions  were  generally  ignored.  The  Pentagon  Papers,  for  ex-
ample, contained no  component  classification.
403INDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
classification  would require  that all of the West  system  be  classified Top
Secret as well.
In  those  situations  in  which  substantive  standards  for  secrecy  are
applied,  they  turn  out  to  be  faint  shadows  of  the  limited  definitions  in
the executive  classification  rules.  Several  national  security  experts  who
testified at the Ellsberg trial, men who had held high posts in the Pentagon
and had  constantly been generating  Top Secret  documents,  had  never  so
much  as seen the governing executive  order  or been instructed  on  classi-
fication standards."
As a defense to the Top Secret classification  of the Pentagon  Papers,
government  experts  laid  out their  substantive  theories  for  the  need  to
protect  the information.  The chief  government  expert  explained  what  I
would call the vacuum cleaner theory of foreign intelligence.  The "enemy"
is assumed to have a voracious  intelligence apparatus  which gathers up all
possible  information  about  the  United  States  which  is  then  sifted  and
pieced together  to form an intelligence pictutre.  Any given piece of infor-
mation not previously known to enemy intelligence might fill in the mosaic
in some crucial way.  Disclosure of United States intelligence  information
about enemy forces, for example, could seriously damage the United States
even though the enemy obviously knows the status of its own forces.  Such
disclosure  would  permit  the  enemy  to  assess  our intelligence.  On  the
basis of such information he might improve his counter-measures  or close
off our intelligence  sources.  By contrast, disclosure of information  about
United States activities on subjects of interest to enemy intelligence would
either  give  the  enemy  valuable  information  or, if  the  information  were
stale, permit the enemy to assess how good or how bad his intelligence had
been,  and,  presumably,  to  take  corrective  measures.  Thus,  the  experts
explained,  even  information  about  long  since  completed  military  opera-
tions  must be kept secret,  lest the enemy  be  given the means to fine-tune
its intelligence systems.
The  government  experts  offered  a  similar  theory  to  justify  the
secrecy  of both military and diplomatic decisionmaking.  Each side wants
to understand  the psychology  of the other  side's players.  Therefore,  in-
formation  showing how  our decisionmakers  think would  give the enemy
an advantage.
These rationalia for  secrecy have  a certain  logic,  and it is apparently
the case that many nondemocratic  societies follow the dictates of that logic
18.  Dr. Morton  Halperin,  former  Assistant  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense,  and  Dr.
Leslie  Gelb,  director  of  the Task  Force  which  produced  the Pentagon  Papers,  both  so
testified.  Transcript  of  Russo  v.  Byrne,  409  U.S.  1219  (1972)  (unpublished,  in  the
Harvard  Law  Library).ASPECTS OF THE EXECUTIVE'S POWER
with some  attention.  Yet it should  also be clear  that the logic is  all  en-
compassing,  justifying  secrecy  of  all  past  and  present  operations  and
decisionmaking  relating to foreign nations.  Reasons  which compel  open-
ness of such information in a democracy  are entirely overlooked.
Once information is classified Top Secret, it tends to remain in that
classification.  Until  1972  the governing  executive  order  called  for con-
tinuing review of all classified information for the purpose of declassifying
or  downgrading  it whenever  national  defense  considerations  permitted.
This provision, however, was  a dead letter from the time it was written.
No continuing  review  ever took place."
Rules  for automatic  termination  of secrecy  after fixed  intervals  of
time  were introduced by executive order  in 1964, but they have not  been
effective because classifiers are given discretion to exempt some categories
of  information  from  their  operation.  Experts  on  the  classification
system  who  testified on  Dr. Ellsberg's  behalf  were certain  that  as  long
as  any  option  was  available  to  the  classifier  to  exempt  material  from
declassification  he  would  use  it  freely.  Those  who  classified  the
Pentagon  Papers  "TOP  SECRET-GROUP  I,"  for  example,  knew
that  "Group  I"  meant  total  exemption  from declassification-in  effect
eternal  secrecy.  But they had  no idea  that  according  to  the  rules,  the
"Group I" category was supposed to be for material originated by foreign
governments  or organizations over which the United States has no juris-
diction, or for special  communications  intelligence  or cryptography.
The  results of  this  system  are  predictably  chao.tic.  Intake  into the
system is voracious.  Legitimate outflow through the prescribed process of
declassification  is utterly constipated.  The  system  is  now  plodding  for-
ward with  efforts to declassify World  War  II  documents.  The experts
do not know how much classified information there is, but they know that
it is continually expanding.  They make estimates in millions of cubic feet
of classified  documents,2" and  agree that a vast  proportion  no longer  re-
motely meets  legitimate  classification  criteria,  assuming that  it ever did.
The major overflow of initially classified information takes the form
of public  and  private  disclosures  by  upper  level  executive  officials.  At
upper executive  levels the line  between  authorized  and unauthorized  dis-
closure is extremely  uncertain.  Technically  any  official  has  authority  to
declassify any information classified by people subordinate to him. 2" Thus
when the President speaks, whether to the nation, to a reporter in private,
19.  Hearings,  supra note  13,  at  659  (testimony  of  David  Cooke).
20.  Id. at 658-59  (statement  of David  Cooke,  Principal  Deputy  Assistant Secretary
for Administration,  Department of Defense).
21.  Exec. Order  No.  11,652,  § 3(a),  3  C.F.R.  378  (1973).INDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
or to a friend over cocktails, he automatically declassifies as he goes. There
is  no procedure,  no  paperwork.  Declassification  simply  follows  in  his
wake.  The same is true for  other  officials so long as  they do not stray
from the pyramids  of classified information which have been generated be-
neath them.  Since no one keeps close track of what information has been
disclosed  by  officials,  vast  amounts  of  documentary  material  remain
stamped  classified although  the information has been  made public.
In  a  sense  this  reflects  the  essence of  the  secrecy  system.  In
practical  operation  it establishes  initial  information  control  over  all na-
tional security  related information, leaving  it to the discretion  of higher
officials to  determine  what  information  should  be  disclosed  in  order  to
obtain  acceptable  levels  of  apparent  candor  and  support.  The  system
functions not to bind upper level executive officials, but to empower them
to release  only the  information  they choose.22
The bureaucratic tendency of self-protection creates a strong pressure
toward ever broader practical  interpretations  of secrecy standards.  Since
secrecy  classification  is  regarded  as  an  inherent  executive  power,  the
practical  expansion  of standards  goes  virtually unchecked  by  outside re-
view.  Civil disobedience  in the forra  of  surreptitious  "unauthorized  dis-
closure"  tends to be the only brake.  Secrecy classification has thus become
an executive  bureaucratic  system  so  uncontrolled  that  it  threatens  the
working  premises  of democratic  decisionmaking.
The result is that decisions of significance to the American electorate
may be taken  and implemented in total secrecy.  Policies  of great impor-
tance  have been  justified  to the  electorate  by  the  Executive's  disclosure
of  supportive  classified  information,  while  information  which  would
support the political  opposition has  been kept  secret.  This was  a major
lesson of the Pentagon Papers with respect to the history of the Vietnam
War.  Yet as  clear  as the threats  which the secrecy  system poses  are, the
task of developing  either judicial or legislative  checks to executive  secrecy
power is exceedingly  difficult.  To approach this problem, we may initially
inquire where the secrecy power falls on the spectrum  of inherent powers.
Secrecy  classification,  on  examination,  would  seem  to  be  a  power
which the President can exercise until Congress stops him.  Although there
is no express  constitutional  delegation  of secrecy  power to the  President,
the reasons  for implying  such a power  are strong.  National  security in-
22.  Hearings  before  the  Foreign  Operations  and  Government  Information  Sub-
committee,  Hearings,  supra note  13,  are  replete  with  statements  to this  effect.  See, e.g.,
id. at 3186-96  (statement  of Rear  Admiral  Gene  R.  La Rogue  (retired),  May  24,  1972).
Affidavit  of Max Frankel,  submitted  in connection  with 1 UNITED  STATES  V.  NEW  YORK
TIMEs  COMPANY  396-413  (J. Goodale  ed.  1971).ASPECTS OF THE EXECUTIVE'S POWER
formation  control  is  a  function  closely  integrated  with  the  President's
express  responsibilities  as  Commander-in-Chief  as  well  as  his  foreign
policy responsibilities.  Moreover, the classification  rules are house rules;
they  apply only within the executive branch."  The  rules  are  established
by executive order, not by statute.  As  such they apply only  to executive
employees  and to those  private  citizens,  mostly defense  contractors,  who
agree to be bound  to them  by contract.  The  President  issues  orders  of
this type much  as a corporation  president  issues orders  binding  his  em-
ployees.  Although  the  secrecy  power  has  enormous  effects  on  govern-
mental decisionmaking, the effects are not focused  on individual citizens.
Issues about the validity of classification,  therefore,  are seldom framed  in
terms of conflict with individual liberty.24
Thus the  President  can persuasively  argue  that control  of  national
information within the executive branch  is so closely integrated  with the
proper functioning of the executive branch that no congressional authority
is needed to establish  a secrecy  classification  system.
On the other hand,  since  secrecy  has  such great  effects  on  matters
properly  within  congressional  province,  Congress  could  unquestionably
exert  its  power  to  regulate  classification  by  requiring  disclosure  when
the interests of democratic decisionmaking  so  require.  The  obvious con-
gressional  interest in this area could  be the basis for  placing the  secrecy
power in the third category, that which requires  congressional  authoriza-
tion.  However,  despite the  possible  efficacy of this  result,  Congress has
taken no action in this respect.  Indeed, the Freedom of Information  Act,
which establishes  a public right of access  to government  information, ex-
pressly excludes  classified information."  Ironically, this  exclusion  which
was meant to establish a public right to know puts  Congress on record for
the first time as recognizing and deferring to the full sweep  of executive
secrecy classification.
The result was played out sadly in EPA v. Mink. 2"  Thirty-two mem-
bers of Congress  brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act to
obtain  disclosure of a report which had been  generated  within the execu-
tive branch  for  the  President  on  the  controversial  underground  nuclear
test known as "Cannikin"  on Amchitka Island.  The report was comprised
of ten separate documents, six of which were classified.  Congresswoman
Mink and  her colleagues  wanted the documents  submitte d in  camera to
23.  Hearings,  supra note  13, at 780  (testimony  of William  Rehnquist).
24.  But cf.  United States  v.  Marchetti,  466  F.2d  1309  (4th  Cir.),  cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063  (1972).
25.  5  U.S.C.  § 552(b)  (1)  (1970).
26.  410 U.S.  73 (1973).INDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
the trial judge so that he could determine which portions of the documents,
if any, justified secrecy,  and then  to disclose  the portions  which did not.
The  Supreme  Court  had  no  choice  but  to  side  with  the  executive
branch.  Mr. Justice Stewart noted in a concurring opinion that the Canni-
kin controversy  was  precisely the kind  of event that  should be opened  to
the fullest  possible  disclosure consistent  with  national defense:
Without  such  disclosure,  factual  information  available  to  the
concerned Executive agencies cannot be considered by the people
or evaluated  by the Congress.  And with the  people  and  their
representatives  reduced to a state  of ignorance,  the  democratic
process is paralyzed.2"
Nonetheless,  Justice Stewart  continued, Congress had built into the
Freedom  of Information  Act
an exemption that provides no  means to question  an Executive
decision to stamp a document "secret,"  however  cynical, myopic,
or even corrupt that  decision  might have been.
.. . Congress chose  . . . to decree blind  acceptance  of Execu-
tive fiat. 2
Given  the  congressional  concession  of  executive  secrecy  power,  it
makes no  difference  whether  the secrecy  power  falls  into  the  second  or
third category  I have  described.  In either  event,  the  Court could  do no
more than point out to Congress that it had the power to impose controls.
The burden  of cutting  into the systems rests  with Congress,  and  inertia
seems to favor the classification system. The longer executive secrecy goes
unchecked  the  less  meaningful  its  already  demeaned  national  security
standards  will become,  and the more  the system  of secrecy  will come  to
mirror the bureaucratic  interests  it can  serve.
Possible  Congressional  Approaches
Already one is hard  pressed to conceive legislation which  could con-
trol the existing system.  Consider the various approaches  Congress might
pursue.
(1)  Legislation  to  Reverse  the  Forces  of  Bureaucratic  Inertia
Registration  requirements  as  prerequisites  for  imposing  a  secrecy
stamp would  eliminate the  virtual anonymity  of the  present  system,  in-
27.  Id. at 94-95.
28.  Id. at 95.
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troduce accountability, and make classification ai more troublesome, hence
perhaps less automatic, process.29  Automatic  declassification over a short
period unless the classifier acted again at the end of the time interval would
have  a similar  effect."0  Likewise,  sanctions  on persons who  overclassify
or fail  to declassify  could create  an incentive  within the  bureaucracy  to-
ward  openness.  The  only  sanctions  in  the  present  system,  practically
speaking, are for breaches  of secrecy."'  One  might also consider  an allo-
cation system-a quota for each agency or' office of how many documents
can be kept under  stamp at  one time, leaving  it to each  office  to clean
out the old  to make  room for the new.  A probably  apocryphal  story has
it that abuses  of classification  were sharply curtailed  one  year  as a result
of a budget squeeze which led to a freeze in the Pentagon on the further
purchase of Top Secret safes.  These suggestions are attractive, but at best
they would curb the quantity and not the quality of abuses.
(2)  Rules  of Exclusion
The  strategy  here  is  to identify  specific  categories  of  information
which are most vital to disclose but which are likely to be kept secret under
the present system.  Such categories  would  not include great  volumes  of
information, but might include critical items  concerning which the abuses
of the current  secrecy  system  are  most serious.  Having  identified  such
categories,  Congress could legislate flat mandates that any such informa-
tion must be reported  immediately to the  electorate  or to an appropriate
body  of the Congress.  Congress  could,  for example,  attempt  to prevent
recurrence  of the secret invasions  and bombings  of the Vietnam  War by
mandating  that,  absent  a  declaration  of  war,  the  President  must  report
immediately to designated committees  of the Congress the presence of ary
29.  The new  executive  order  moves  in  this  direction.  Exec.  Order  No.  11,652,  §
4(b),  3 C.F.R. 379 (1973)  ; DOD  Directive, 32  C.F.R.  §§  159.200,  201  (1973).  But clas-
sification in spite of the  rules  of executive orders  rather  than  in conformity  to them  has
been  the practice  in  the  past.  It  is  too  soon  to  tell whether  the  rules  of  the  new  ex-
ecutive  order  will be effective.
30.  Executive  Order  No.  11,652  provides  an  automatic  downgrading  schedule  for
Top  Secret which  would  declassify  after  ten years.  But  the  classifier  may  exempt  in-
formation  from the downgrading  schedule altogether  if it falls  into  described  exemption
categories.  After ten  years,  exempted  material  may  be  reviewed  on  request  if the  peti-
tioner  for  review  can  particularly  identify  the  document.  Exec.  Order  No.  11,652,  §§
5(A),  (B),  (C),  3  C.F.R.  380-81  (1973).
31.  According  to  David  Cooke,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense,  between
July  1, 1967,  and  June  30,  1971,  there  were  2,372  administrative  penalties  imposed  on
DOD  personnel  for  failure adequately  to  protect classified  information,  none for  exces-
sive  classification or excessive  restriction  on access to information.  Hearings,  mtpra note
13,  at  2727  (letter  from  David  Cooke  to  Chairman  Moorhead).  Exec.  Order  No.
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American troops on or over foreign territory. 82  The difficulty here, how-
ever, is that this is a powerful but limited approach.  The particulars  are
difficult to formulate, and undoubtedly hard to  legislate.
(3)  The Use of Outside Review
Legislation  could establish  some device  outside the executive branch
for  review of  classified  material.  Yet  sheer volume  would  prevent  any
agency from reviewing all of it.  Some method for choosing which classi-
fied secrets should be reviewed is essential.  One obvious answer is to limit
review  according to citizen  demand, but this depends  on reasonably well-
informed citizen complainants.  In  other words, Congress  could eliminate
or modify  the  current  exclusion  in the  Freedom  of Information  Act to
permit review to be  initiated by citizen  demand, but most  citizens  would
not know  what to ask for.  A system of public listings of classified  docu-
ments, similar to a library catalogue, might be conceived-, but such an ap-
proach  would  confront  the  present  practice  of  classifying  the  titles  of
many documents  as well as the contents.  There are, of course, knowledge-
able  insiders  who  know  what  is  being kept  secret  and  may  think  it  is
wrong.  The  hardiest  of these  "leak."  But  an  external  system  of  com-
plaint  and  official  inquiry  would  not  provide  the  insiders  an  alterna-
tive  to  leaking  unless  they  were  prepared  to  suffer  the  bureaucratic
comsequences  of  openly  confronting  the  system.  One  can  conceive
of  anonymous  or  privileged  complaint  systems  utilizing  an  ombuds-
man,  but  none  which  is  realistic.  All  systems  of  revew  raise  ques-
tions of who  will  clear  the  reviewers.  A  reviewing  board  of  ex-gener-
als would help very little,88 while straight forward provisions for judicial
review  lead to  raised  eyebrows  about the trusiworthiness  of the  judges.
The more acceptable the reviewer is to the national security establishment,
the less effective one would expect the review to be.
No strategy will succeed completely. For every system that is brought
under control a new secrecy  system can be created.  In fact, many already
exist above Top Secret.8"  Each strategy  of control can  be  circumvented
by  a bureaucracy  sufficiently  committed  to  secrecy  as  a  means  of  pro-
tection and an instrument of power.  This, in fact, signals the broad under-
lying  problem.  The  national security  bureaucracy  has  become  tremend-
32.  This  approach  is  advocated  by  Dr.  Morton  Halperin,  now  the  director  of  the
National  Security Project of the  A.C.L.U.
3a.  Exec.  Order  No.  11,652,  § 7,  3  C.F.R.  383-85  (1973),  provides  for  an  inter-
agency  review  committee  made  up  of  representatives  from  the  Departments  of  jState,
Defense, and Justice, and the  A.E.C.,  C.I.A.  and N.S.C.  Id.
34.  There  are,  for  example,  higher  than  Top  Secret  classification  categories  for
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ously strong and  difficult to penetrate,  insulated  even from the operation
of the rule of law.  This might be tolerable if the values of the bureaucracy
coincided  with the values  of  our  constitutional  democracy,  but  unfortu-
nately they diverge.  The national security establishment  trains meif in the
values  of  obedience,  discipline,  conformity,  and  ends  over  means.  It
suppresses the liberal values of openness,  dissent,  and morality of means.
We see  the flowering of this in  both the Vietnam  War  and  Watergate.
It is the character  of the national security bureaucracy which  makes
effective  disclosure  legislation so  difficult,  and  yet,  so  essential.  Secrecy,
like power,  tends  to  corrupt.  We  expect  an  enormous  amount  of  any
President  to manage  and wield the powers  of  espionage,  diplomacy  and
war,  while  at  the  same  time  maintaining  scrupulous  sensitivity  to  the
values  of democracy and individuality at home.  Only by the assertion  of
democratic values by the other branches of government, as guides to which
the Executive should conform,  can  we hope and  expect  that the national
security  agencies  will not altogether  lose sight  of them.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WIRETAPPING
Much  less  is  known  about  foreign  intelligence  wiretapping  than
about secrecy  classification.  What we  do  know,  however,  suggests  that
the same elements  which characterize the malfunctioning of the  classifica-
tion system carry over  to national security wiretapping  as well.  These in-
dude:  the bureaucratic  pressure  to expand  the  practice  on  the  principle
that information  is always  useful; a lack of standards for controlling  the
practice;  and an absence  of any meaningful  review of the practice outside
the executive branch.  But  the problems  of national  security  wiretapping
are set against a very different constitutional  and  legislative  background
than that of secrecy classifications,  and this allows  the courts to assume a
more active role in checking abuses of the power.
The framework  for considering  the validity of an inherent executive
power to wiretap  in connection with foreign intelligence was  set down by
the Supreme Court in United States v. United States District  Court, 3 5 the
so-called  Keith  case  involving  domestic  national  security  wiretaps  on
political  groups.  The case presents  a marked  contrast to EPA  v. Mink,
and  nicely  illustrates  the  judicial  strategy  of  passing  national  security
questions to Congress.
The Executive justified its unwarranted tapping of domestic political
groups in Keith by the national security argument that subversive political
groups must be stopped before they accomplish their  intended subversion.
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Since  requiring  the executive  branch  to  amass  enough  evidence  of  sub-
versive plots to meet the probable cause requirement  for a judicial warrant
would  often  have  the  effect  of  forcing  the  Executive  to  wait  until  the
damage  had been  done,  protection of  national  security, it  is  argued,  re-
quires the executive branch to conduct protective surveillance.
3 6
The  Supreme  Court  responded  to this  argument  by  differentiating
between the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amend-
ment.  It asserted that a judicial warrant is an essential precondition to any
domestic  wiretap.  However,  it  stated  in  dicta  that  the  procedures  and
standards  on which the warrant would  issue are subject to adjustment by
Congress  to meet the needs of national security.  A  result of this opinion
is  that  the  Executive  is  checked  by  the  declaration  that  domestic  taps
require  warrants  under  existing  probable  cause  standards;  and  if  the
Executive  wishes  to lessen  these  restrictions,  it must  appeal  to  and  con-
vince  the  Congress.  This  result  would,  of  course,  have been  impossible
had  Congress  already  recognized  an  inherent  executive  national  security
wiretap power as it had in the Freedom  of Information Act. But Congress
had, in fact, written  a careful provision into  its  1968  wiretap  legislation
saying  that  it meant  neither  to  recognize  nor  to  override  any  inherent
executive wiretap power."'
The Court's invitation to Congress to dilute probable cause  standard&
and to tailor warrant procedures  to executive needs may dissatisfy  fourth
amendment  purists, but in  fact it is the  strategic  core  of  the opinion.  It
sets  a  strategy  for  dealing  with  the  Executive's  national  security  argu-
ments which can  be employed to deal with other forms of national  security
wiretapping.  The Keith Court carefully left open  the validity  of inherent
executive powers  of surveillance  and intrusion  where matters  relating to
foreign  powers  are corncerned, 8  and no case  in the Supreme  Court  since
Keith has dealt with taps relating to foreign affairs.
Following Keith, former Attorney General  Richardson announced  on
September  12,  1973  that the Attorney  General would  continue to approve
surveillance  without warrant when  convinced that
it is necessary  (1)  to  protect  the nation  against  actual  or po-
tential  attack  or  other  hostile  acts  of  a foreign  power;  (2)  to
obtain  foreign  intelligence  information  deemed  essential  to  the
36.  Id. at 319.
37.  18  U.S.C. § 2511 (3)  (1970)  ; see United  States  v. United  States  District  Court,
407 U.S. 297, 301-08  (1972).
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security of the United States; or  (3)  to protect national security
information  against foreign intelligence activities.89
This amounts to an assertion of three separate inherent powers, the cores
of which are taps to stop leaks of classified information, taps on spies and
saboteurs,  and  taps  on  foreign  missions,  i.e.,  embassies  and  diplomats.
Each illustrates a different segment  on the spectrum  of inherent  powers.
Leakers
The Kissinger taps are the best known examples of taps to stop leaks.
There  were  seventeen  such  taps,  thirteen  initiated  against  government
employees and four  against newsmen  who  obviously  had  excellent  news
sources within the adminstration.  None of the seventeen persons had  the
slightest connection  with any  foreign  intelligence organization.
It  may not be immediately  clear  how the executive  branch  justifies
these taps  as necessary to protect  national  security  information  "against
foreign  intelligence  activities."  The reasoning  is as  follows:  foreign  in-
telligence  organizations  absorb  information  from  American  newspapers,
and,  therefore,  it is  essential  to  control  leaks to the American  press  in
order to prevent the leaked information  from reaching foreign  intelligence
agencies.
The logic is impeccable,  but like the vacuum  cleaner theory of intel-
ligence, it sweeps  up too much.  The logic, if followed to  its natural con-
clusions, would  give enormous  range  to the asserted  foreign  intelligence
wiretap power. It could extend to any government official with  access  to
classified information, any recently resigned government official who had
had such access, all congressmen, a host of persons with access to classified
information  in private indutry, and  all  persons,  including  newsmen,  sus-
pected of receiving classified information from unauthorized sources. Given
the sprawling nature of  the secrecy  classification  and  clearance  system,
pretext could be  found for tapping most persons associated  with the gov-
ernment.
The inherent  power to wiretap  to stop  leaks  would,  then,  put  into
executive  hands  a tool  with great  potential  for  abuse.  This  includes  the
power  to check a person's  political  loyalties  or to gather  information  on
political  enemies,  regardless  of whether  the person  were  truly  suspected
of leaking.  If not subject to check by outside review, such wiretaps would
remain  entirely  within  the executive  branch, not  to  be  disclosed  except
39.  Department of Justice,  Press  Release,  Sept.  12,  1973,  reproduced  in 14  CRIM.  L.
REP. 2042  (1973).  This enumeration  tracks  the language of  18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)  (1970).
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unwittingly  in  criminal  cases4  when  the  disclosures  are  unable  to  be
presented  by  dropping the  criminal  prosecution.  Even  when the  power
is  truly  used  to  stop  leaks,  its  purpose  is  still  likely  to  be  political.
Obviously, presidents do not get upset over every leak of classified infor-
mation  to the  public  press.  Leaks  are  everyday  occurrences.  It  is  the
anti-administration  leak,  the  politically  embarrasing  leak  which  causes
presidents to smoke up the wires with orders to find the culprit-the leak
of Westmoreland's  request for 206,000 additional troops for Vietnam, the
bombing of Cambodia,  and the lie in the President's tilt toward Pakistam.
Interestingly, two of the Kissinger taps were on men who had secur-
ity clearances  but who  had very  little  actual  access  to  national  security
information. Two of the taps were on persons who were  on the staff of the
National  Security  Council when the taps were initiated but who soon  left
and became affiliated with political figures opposed  to the Administration
-one  with Senator Fulbright, 1 one with Senator Muskie 2  Yet the taps
continued.  The longest of the Kissinger taps was directed against one of
these men, Morton Halperin."
Unwarranted  taps  on  newsmen  illustrate  the  greatest  threat.  Even
under  Branzberg v. Hayes,"  which  eliminated  the  newsmen's  privilege
to  protect  his  sources  from  judicial  inquiry,  the  Supreme  Court  left
room for newsmen to show that inquiries  about their  sources were made
in bad faith  for the purpose of closing off sources.  Given  the aspects  of
political information control which infect the security classification system,
it is flatly unrealistic to assume that such a tapping power  would be self-
limited by the executive  branch to good  faith concerns for  the protection
of national security information.
What is the role of the Judiciary  in checking such taps?  As a legal
40.  Disclosure of  the Kissinger  taps was  prompted  by  pressures  from  the Ellsberg
case.  Prior  to trial the trial judge ordered the Justice Department  to inform the defense
whether the  defendants,  their  lawyers or  their  defense consultants  had been  overheard  on
wiretaps.  The Justice Department denied that either Ellsberg or Halperin  had  been over-
heard  (both  had  been  overheard  talking  on  Halperin's  tapped  phone).  Newspaper
stories hinting at the Kissinger  taps appeared in the Washington  Post, May 3,  1973,  at 1,
col.  1.  These prompted  further defense  motions  and led  to  the internal  investigation  by
Acting  FBI  Director  Ruckelshaus  which  ultimately  resulted  in  disclosure  of  the  taps.
Hearings on the Nomination of  William D.  Rickelshaus, of Indiana, to  Be  Deputy At-
torney  General Before  the  Senate  Comm.  on  the Judiciary, 93d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  3-26
(1973)  (explanation  of William  D. Ruckelshaus).
41.  William  Safire along with John Sears.
42.  Richard  Moose.
43.  Morton  Halperin_  Coincidentally,  his  name  appeared  three  times  on  White
House  political  enemies  lists,  once  with the  notation  "a scandal  would  be  most helpful
here."  See Hearings Before the Select Senate Comm.  on Presidential  Campaign Activi-
ties, 93d Cong.,  1st  Sess.  1695  (1973)  [hereinafter  cited as Select Committee Hearings].
44.  408  U.S.  665,  707-08  (1972).
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matter taps to stop leaks are closely analogous to the unwarranted domestic
national  security  wiretaps  declared  unconstitutional  in  Keith.  The  taps
are on American  citizens  in this country  having no connection  whatever
with foreign powers.  They- threaten well-defined  first  amendment  inter-
ests. Indeed, the Executive's argument to support unwarranted  tapping of
leakers  is  similar  to its  argument  advanced  in  Keith, i.e.,  leakers  must
be found and stopped before they go too far in compromising vital national
security  information,  and this  requires  surveillance  without  establishing
probable cause.
Given  the general  state  of  corruption  of the  classification  system,
this  argument  is  not compelling.  Its  rejection,  however,  would  neces-
sarily  involve  the  Judiciary  in  second  guessing  the  Executive  on  the
national  security considerations  which supposedly  underlie  a  decision  to
wiretap.  The strategy in Keith, however,  would  serve this  case as well:
insistence  on  a judicial  warrant  as  a  precondition  to  the  wiretap,  but
suggesting that Congress  could lower  the probable  cause  requirement  if
it found the national security argument  persuasive.
Preservation  of the warrant requirement,  even under greatly  dimin-
ished  probable  cause  standards,  would  still  provide  major  safeguards
against abuse.  Fourth amendment  rhetoric to the contrary, the  essential
protection  of the warrant  procedure  does not  lie in the neutral magistrate
making a probable cause assessment.  For example, of 816 applications for
wiretap warrants  during  1971,  not  one  was  denied.  In  1972,  of  860
applications,  855  were granted.45  The essential  check of the warrant pro-
cedure  lies rather  in its promise of executive  accountability,  and  accom-
panying procedural controls.  These protections  in the present wiretap law
are substantial, including requirements that the application for warrants be
duly supported by affidavits,4" that full records  of the tap be kept,4 7  tapes
preserved, 4"  the utility of the tap periodically reviewed,49  the degree of in-
trusion  minimized"  (although  courts  are  still  struggling  to  articulate
what this means),"  and ultimate disclosure of the tap to the person  who
is the object of it."
45.  ADMINISTRATIVE  OFFICE  OF  UNITED  STATES  COURTS,  REPORTS  ON  APPLICATIONS
FOR ORDFns  AUTHORIZING  OR  APPROVING  THE  INTERCEPTION  OF WIRE  OR  ORAL  COMMUNI-
CATIONS,  1972,  1973  (1973).
46.  18 U.S.C. § 2518  (1970).
47.  Id.  § 2518(8)(b).
48.  Id.  § 2518(8) (a).
49.  Id. § 2518(5).
50.  Id.
51.  E.g.,  United States  v. Bynum,  485  F.2d  490  (2d  Cir.  1973);  United  States  v.
Scott, 331  F. Supp.  233  (D.D.C.  1971).
52.  18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)  (d)  (1970).INDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
The Kissinger taps  illustrate the  utter lack  of procedural protections
in the absence of such warrant procedures.  The Hulperin tap, for example,
was requested,  authorized, and installed all on the same day.53  Such speed
was possible  because no real justification had to be prepared.  Once John
Mitchell  initialled  the request,  an  FBI  agent called  the  Chesapeake  and
Potomac Telephone  Company and orally directed the tap.  The Telephone
Company  immediately  installed  the  tap  at  its  central  switching  board,
wiring the Halperin's home telephone to a leased FBI line which runs from
the Telephone  Company office to the Old Post Office Building in down-
town Washington,  the Bureau's  main listening post.  In effect,  the Tele-
phone  Company  installed  a remote  extension  on  the Halperin's  phone."
The Telephone  Company never  saw any authorization nor  did it ever re-
ceive  any  written  communication  from the  Bureau.  It  kept  a  minimal
record of the tap while it was in place, but destroyed even that record when
the tap was  removed,  as  was their  normal  practice  for  such taps  in the
Washington  area.5  The  tap  remained  in  place  for twenty-one  months
with no further  review  by  the  Attorney  General  of  its  necessity.  Con-
versations, including those of Mrs. Halperin,  perhaps also  of the children,
were  taped  and transcribed  before  the  tapes  were destroyed." 0
The  power to wiretap  to stop  leaks,  like the  power  to tap  domestic
political  groups,  can and should be  regarded  as  a power  which  can only
be exercised  by the Executive if authorized by Congress.  While the power
to classify  national  security information  and  refuse  to  disclose  it to the
public  may be  a power  inherent to the Executive,  the  power to wiretap
to protect it is  at once  more remote  from  protection  of national security
and more intrusive on individual  liberties.  In the absence of an emergency,
there is no reason why the executive branch should be permitted to avoid
justifying  its  general  need  for  such  taps  to  Congress  and  its  particular
need for a specific tap to a court.  The tapping of suspected  leakers,  there-
fore,  should  be  judged  a  power which  is  not  inherent to  the  executive
branch.
Spies and Saboteurs
A claimed inherent executive  power to wiretap  spies would  seem,  at
first, to  stand  on  different  ground.  Tapping  the  espionage  agents  of
foreign  governments  has  a  clear  international  character  and  seems  a
53.  Deposition of William  D. Ruckelshaus,  Halperin v. Kissinger,  Civil  No.  1187-73
(Dist.  Ct. D.C.).
54.  Statement  of  Counsel  for  Chesapeake  and  Potomac  Telephone  Co.,  id.
55.  Id.
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logical  extension  of  our  government's  espionage  and  counterespionage
program  abroad.  Agents of foreign  powers  engaged  in spying might  be
thought to have diminished  rights  to  claim the  protections  of  our Con-
stitution, and the national security dangers from successful  spying might
be seen  as potentially  very great.  Thus  at  first glance,  the case  for  an
inherent  executive  power to wiretap spies  seems a  strong one, at least  in
the absence of congressional legislation barring or regulating such taps.
However  on  second  look  I  conclude  that  the  spy  tapping  power
should  be treated  just as  the power to tap leakers  and  domestic political
organizations.  Spying  is  covered  directly  by  espionage  laws,5"  hence
traditional  warrant  procedures  are fully  available.  If the  subject's covert
connection  with a  foreign  power  has  been  established,  there  seems  no
impediment  to demonstrating this before a magistrate.  If  it has not been
established, then there is no basis for affording the subject less than  full
constitutional protections, i.e., requiring a warrant.
Most important, the foreign orientation of legitimate spy taps should
not  obscure the  possible  abuses  of such  taps.  The standards  which  the
Executive would be applying without review, assuming the inherent power
were  recognized,  would have no hard edges.  Insulated from  review,  one
would expect  the Executive  to stretch  the standards  to their limits, just
as it has done in other national security areas.  Who is a spy?  How much
suspicion  is  needed?  That  John  Ehrlichman  justified  the burglary  of
Dr. Ellsberg's  phychiatrist's  office by the  need to find out if a foreign spy
ring was involved in the Pentagon Papers case illustrates the expansiveness
of this area.58  In fact, Ehrlichman's response could be made in connection
with almost  any event adverse  to the Administration.
There  seems no real necessity for the executive branch to avoid judi-
cial  approval  and review of its  spy taps.  The threat  which  such tapping
poses  to  individual  liberties  is  significant  and  has  been  demonstrated.
Furthermore,  the necessity  for  avoiding  warrant  procedures  is  unclear.
Congress has already provided that in emergency situations the Executive
can  tap  first and  obtain  a warrant  later. 55  Absent  any  emergency,  the
Executive  should  hesitate to  show  probable cause  only  if the  Executive
does not trust the judge's decision. Perhaps this is an area where  Congress
might also wisely lower probable cause standards and permit the Executive
to make its warrant  application  to  a judge  of  its own  choosing.  But it
57.  See,  e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§  793, 794  (1970).
58.  Select Committee Hearings,  supra note 43,  at 2576-77,  2632,  2673.
59.  18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)  (1970).
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is, nonetheless,  an area of  executive activity  for which the  establishment
and maintenance  of a judicial  check  seem  essential.
Foreign  Mission Taps
Taps  on  foreign  missions-embassies  and  diplomats-present  the
strongest case  for inherent  executive  power.  Such  taps  are  installed  for
the purpose of gathering  foreign intelligence, not to catch criminals;  thus
there are no traditionally  justiciable standards  against which a magistrate
could  make a  probable  cause  assessment,  and  none suggest  themselves.
Judges could do little more than determine whether an appropriate person
in the executive  branch  had  made the  judgment that the  tap would pro-
duce useful foreign intelligene information. 60  Such taps intrude upon pri-
vate conversations, but the degree of intrusion is relatively low. Expecta-
tions of privacy are minimal in the diplomatic community.  Notwithstand-
ing reciprocal  treaty  agreements  to  respect the  integrity  and privacy  of
diplomats and embassies,"' diplomats apparently expect al  manner of sur-
veillance as a part of the law of the international jungle.2
60.  Bot cf. United  States v.  Reynolds,  345  U.S.  1  (1952).
61.  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic Relations,  open for signature, April  18,  1961,
T.I.A.S.  No.  7502,  500  U.N.T.S.  75  [hereinafter  cited  as  Vienna  Convention].  Provi-
sions  of the  treaty  do  not  explicitly  prohibit  wiretapping  if  the  installation  of  the  tap
does  not involve a physical  trespass.  Article 22  provides:
The  premises  of  the  mission  shall  be  inviolable.  The  agents  of  the  receiving
State may not  enter them,  except  with  the consent  of  the  head  of the mission.
Article 27  provides:
The receiving  State  shall  permit  and  protect  free  communication  on  the part  of
the  mission  for all  official  purposes  ....  The  official  correspondence  of  the
mission  shall  be  inviolable.
Article  29  provides:  "The  person of a diplomatic  agent  shall be  inviolable.  . . ."  Ar-
ticle  30  provides:  "The  private  residence  of  a  diplomatic  agent  shall  enjoy  the  same
inviolability  and protection  as the  premises  of the mission."  This  treaty was  ratified  by
the  Senate  on  September  14,  1965,  and  ratified  by  the  President  on  November  8,  1972.
It entered  into  force  with  respect  to the United  States  on  December  13,  1972.
62.  The  Russians  counsel  their  diplomats  to  assume  that  they  will  be  overheard
when they talk on  the telephone.  See A.  ORLovF,  HANDBOOK  OF  INTELLIGENCE AND  GuE-
ILLA  WARFARE  114  (1965)  ;  0.  PENxcovsxiY,  THE  PENKOVSKIY  PAPERS  138-39  (1965).
See also A.  DULLES,  THE  CRAFT  OF  INTELLIGENCE  70  (1962).  Ambassador  Kennan,  in
his  memoirs,  suggests  that  American  diplomats  make  the  same  reasonable  assumption.
See  G. KENNAN,  MEMOIRS,  1950-1963,  at  135  (1973).
Sometimes diplomats  even  make use of the  assumed  tap as a way of  communicating
information  to  opposing  governments.  One  of  the  toughest  items  from  the  Pentagon
Papers  to  deal  with  in  the  Ellsberg  trial  was  an  item  from  the  volumes  chronicling
United States  diplomatic  contacts  with  North Vietnam-a  verbatim  transcript of  a tele-
phone  conversation  between Alexy  Kosygin  in  London and Leonid  Brezhnev  in  Moscow.
The  text of  the Pentagon  Papers  read as  follows:
On the  same day,  Cooper  reported  that he  had been  told in  the Foreign  Office
that:  (a)  between  3:00  a.m.  and  3:47  a.m.  London  time  (13  February)  three
priority  "President's  Cipher"  telegrams  were sent  from the t$oviet  delegation  in
London  to  Moscow;  (b)  at 9:30  a.m. today  according  to a  telephone  intercept
Kosygin  called  Breshnev  and  said  "a great  possibility  of  achieving  the aim,  if
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Members of foreign diplomatic missions, morover, may have dimin-
ished standing to assert fourth amendment  rights.  As  members  of diplo-
matic  missions  they  have  diplomatic  immunities  which  place  them  in  a
different legal position  vis-a-vis  the  Constitution  and  domestic  law than
other aliens and citizens."  While we normally think of diplomatic  immu-
nity as a special  protection,  it can be seen also merely as insulation from
the operation of domestic law whereby all but incidental problems of diplo-
matic missions are treated as matters for resolution between nations.  The
added  protection of diplomatic immunity from the operation of  domestic
law would, in this view,  carry with it a diminished  capacity to  claim the
protections of domestic law, including the fourth amendment, against oper-
ations of the executive branch. Thus, whle a tap on an embassy may give
rise to a  diplomatic  complaint  against  the United  States,  it  would  not
give rise to litigation  in the domestic courts of either  nation.
Foreign mission  taps  will  pick  up conversations  of  United  States
citizens  who  call  into the tapped  phone.  Such  citizens,  of course,  have
undiminished  fourth  amendment  rights.  The  question  is  whether  the
scope  of  those  rights  extends  to  calls  made  to  foreign  missions.
Most calls  to foreign missions  are  likely to  be  on business  matters, and
many persons calling foreign missions in this country may have no greater
expectation  of privacy than they would have  if calling  a foreign govern-
ment office in a foreign country.  The  degree  of intrusion from the inci-
dental  overhearings  is  likely  to  be  far  less  than  if the  tap  were  on  the
citizen's  phone.  Nonetheless,  while  the  significance  of  incidental  over-
hearings  of United  States  citizens  may  be  discounted,  they  present  the
most serious conceptual  problem to the recognition  of an inherent power
to tap foreign missions.
Of key  importance  is that  foreign  mission  taps  are not  subject  to
infinite expansion and gross abuse.  Whereas a tapping power which could
be  directed at suspected  leakers  or  suspected  spies  would,  as  a  practical
matter, give the executive branch power to tap almost anyone for any pur-
the  Vietnamese  will  understand  the  present  situation  that  we  have  passed  to
them; all  they need  do  is give  a confidential  declaration.
- UITED  STATEs-VETNAm  RELATIONS  1945-1967:  NEGOTIATION  CONTAcTs-SuN-
PLOFWER  61-62  (196  ),  in record of  United $tates  v. Russo and Ellsberg, No. 9373-WMB-
CD  (C.D.Cal.  1972)  (transcript  on  file  at Harvard  Law  School).  Apparently  Ellsberg
had  blown a wiretap.  Our investigation  into the  circumstances  of  the call  convinced  us,
and  I  hope  we convinced  the  jury, that  Kosygin made his  call on  an open  line  from his
room  in  Claridge's  Hotel,  cognizant  that the  British  and  American  governments  would
know in  the most credible way  that he was  actually  conveying  back to  Moscow  the  mes-
sages he had told the British  and Americans  he would communicate.  A  short time  later
he went to  the  Russian  embassy  in  London  and  sent  a  coded  message  to  Moscow,  evi-
dently to convey information  that he did  not want  overheard.
63.  Vienna  Convention,  supra  note 61,  arts. 31-41.INDIANA  LAW  JOURNAL
pose, a tapping power  limited  to  embassies  and persons  with  diplomatic
immunity has  bright lines  at its  edges.  The category of persons  subject
to  such  taps  is  limited  in  a manner  that  does  not  permit  discretionary
expansion at the margins.  Also, it is made up of persons  who offer little
incentive  for tapping other than for the foreign intelligence  purposes which
justify the power.
The executive branch will not state publicly that our government taps
foreign  embassies  and  diplomats.  The  niceties  of  international  discourse
prevent that.  If challenged, however,  the Executive would  doubtless  claim
great utility for such taps.  One can  also picture  the  counterclaims.  The
very fact that diplomats expect to be tapped may mean that the tappers sel-
dom overhear anything but routine embassy business  and chitchat. On the
vacuum  cleaner  and  personality  approaches  to  intelligence  gathering,
everything is valuable.  But whether  such value is real or offsets the  fourth
amendment interest at stake is another  question.  Ramsey  Clark, based on
his exposure  to such taps while Attorney General,  sharply  questions  their
utility.  He stated:
I know that not one percent of the information that is picked up
has  any  possible  utility.  It would  only  be  an  act  of  extreme
careless~ess  or extreme urgency that would  cause  the use  of  a
channel that is assumed by reasonable people  in the foreign  mis-
sions in this country to be under surveillance."'
Asked what impact on national security would follow from a discontinua-
tion of all  such taps,  Clark answered,  "absolutely  zero."
A direct clash of views on the utility of embassy taps is precisely the
kind of national security question which courts would have great  difficulty
in litigating and evaluating, especially if the outcome were to be a rejection
of  the Executive's  national  security  arguments.  This  suggests  that  the
Keith  strategy  of  shunting  the  national  security  questions  to  Congress
might be appropriate.  The problem,  however,  is more complex here.  Con-
gress is in no better position than the Executive to make a public  declara-
tion that foreign mission taps are acceptable. Yet Congress cannot delegate
power secretly.  Although congressional hearings may be held in executive
session,  Congress must  pass  a public statute,  if it wishes  to regulate the
warrant procedures  and adjust the standards  of probable cause  to suit the
Executive's  needs.  Lower  courts,  when  confronted  with  embassy  taps,
64.  Hearings on  Practices  and Procedures of  the Department of  Justice for  War-
rantless Wiretapping and Other Electronic Surveillance Before  the Subcomm.  on  Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure o'f  the  Senate  Comm.  on  the  Judiciary. 92d  Cong.,  2d
Sess.  53  (1972).
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have  faced  similar problems  of  public  articulation.  They  have  resolved
them by adjudicating the legality of embassy taps in camera, and delivering
opinions which neither identify the locus nor the specific nature of the tap.
Such an approach  is possible only if the judicial outcome  is to uphold the
legality  of the unwarranted  taps.  Thus, where  foreign  mission  taps  are
concerned, the Keith approach  is not truly available.
The courts, then, must directly  resolve the conflict between national
security and individual  liberties  which  foreign  mission taps present.  On
the one hand, there is no way to finesse the problem of judicial competence
to  weigh  national  security  claims.  This  must  be  weighed  against  the
limited  and  relatively  mild intrusions  on  individual  liberties  which  such
taps entail.  The balance thus supports finding an inherent executive  power
to undertake  such taps, subject to control by the Congress  if it chooses  to
assert  it.  This  is  an  acceptable,  albeit  uncomfortable,  outcome  precisely
because this  executive  power, unlike  the powers  of  secrecy  classification,
leak-tapping  and spy-tapping,  does  not pose the kind  of threat to  demo-
cratic  principles which  demands an outside  check.
CONCLUSION
Secrecy and wiretapping are by no means  the only national  security
powers which  demand  control,  but they  do illustrate  the great  extent  to
which  the  political  advantages  of information  control  can  lead the  exec-
utive branch  to corrupt national security  standards  and  to override  indi-
vidual  liberties.  They  illustrate,  also,  possibilities  and  difficulties  of
bringing national security powers  under  control, and  the extent to which
the task of doing so  is  shared  and divided  between Court  and  Congress.
The Vietnam War  and Watergate may mark an end to the cold war era.
Both seem  to  be ultimate expressions  of a cold  war mentality,  revealing
the threats  of rampant  secrecy  and  unchecked  executive  powers  to con-
duct  covert  operations.  The  hallmark  of  the  cold  war  era  has  been  a
willingness to compromise basic American ideals to the supposed necessi-
ties of national security.  Perhaps Vietnam and Watergate will sufficiently
discredit the mystique of national security to permit a resurgence  of those
ideals.